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I visited the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) in September 2012 in order to research 
the founding and institutional development of the Beiping
1
 Psychopathic Hospital. The Hospital, 
which was managed and funded by the Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) in conjunction 
with the Beiping municipal authorities, was established in 1933 and continued to be jointly run 
by the PUMC until 1939. The research that I conducted at the Archive Center will be 
incorporated into my doctoral dissertation, “Spit, Chains, and Hospital Beds: A History of 
Insanity in Republican Beijing, 1912-1937,” which documents institutional and 
phenomenological perspectives on what it meant to be “mad” in early twentieth century China. 
 The main sources I consulted included the China Medical Board, Inc. (CMB) records 
from the PUMC’s department of neurology, Rockefeller Foundation (RF) records on PUMC 
administration, and a CMB video entitled “An Eight Month Experiment,” which documented the 
transfer of the police-run municipal asylum to the control of the PUMC in 1933. Although I had 
previously spent time researching this topic in Mainland China, my understanding of the 
institutional development of the PUMC—as well as its outreach efforts to the larger Beijing 
community—was cursory at best. These records helped to fill in fundamental gaps in my 
knowledge, as well as provide insights into the goals of the PUMC in taking over the 
responsibility of managing the Beiping Psychopathic Hospital. 
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Suspicions Confirmed 
The first half of my dissertation, which delineates a chronological, institutional history of 
madness in Republican Beijing, shows that Western medical professionals and philanthropic 
organizations generally asserted a Whiggish view of medical and institutional progress; that is to 
say, the vast majority of Western medical practitioners believed that the advent of the Western 
hospital and the growth in Western medical practice in China constituted an undeniable progress 
and advancement over so-called traditional Chinese medicine. With this in mind, one of my main 
goals in consulting these collections was to determine the scale, scope, and goals of the PUMC 
and CMB in involving itself in medical education in China (and particularly in Beijing). 
 As I suspected, medical relief efforts that were sponsored by the RF and CMB were 
extremely widespread. Prior to even taking over the PUMC, the RF sent an exploratory mission 
throughout north, south, and western China in 1914 to determine where to focus its efforts. The 
RF ultimately settled on Beijing, since a preexistent hospital (then known simply as the Union 
Medical College) had already been erected there by Catholic missionaries, and the simultaneous 
medical-cum-religious efforts of the hospital corresponded well to the RF’s mission statement.2 
The goals of the CMB were lofty. In a historical record of the CMB (prior to becoming 
incorporated), the author noted that two of the CMB’s main objectives in establishing teaching 
hospitals in China was to “create public confidence in scientifically trained doctors” so as to 
“educate the people in the nature and methods of Western medicine,” and to provide models for 
other hospitals, “especially for imitation by the Chinese.”3 In other words, the purpose of 
establishing the PUMC was not simply to treat Chinese patients, but to spread the gospel of 
Western medicine throughout Asia.  
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 The American practitioners on the 1914 China Medical Commission were generally 
dismissive of traditional Chinese medical practices. Noting that the Chinese knew nothing of 
sanitation, public health or preventive care, they wrote back to the RF that “health conditions in 
China are bad beyond anything which the members of the Commission had anticipated,” and that 
traditional medical doctors “know nothing of western medical science” and employed “such 
absurd methods as acupuncture.”4 The denigration of Chinese medical practice continued 
throughout the early existence of the PUMC, particularly as it concerned the welfare of the 
mentally ill. In correspondence between Dr. Richard Lyman, who assumed control over the 
department of neurology in 1933, and Roger Greene of the RF, Lyman noted that the incidence 
and etiology of mental diseases in China could not be known due to the fact that the majority of 
mentally ill patients “are kept under the cover of the home and never come into our hands for 
observations.”5 Since many Chinese of the time did not consider insanity to be a medical 
condition, it did not occur to them to bring the mentally ill to a hospital or clinic for treatment. 
 Indeed, one of the main reasons that the PUMC agreed to undertake the project of 
administering the Psychopathic Hospital was due to the fact that no other institution of its kind 
existed in Beijing at the time. Although the municipal police had been running an asylum in the 
city since 1912, the institution was “really a prison for insane criminals” and not a place of 
rehabilitation.
6
 Thus, the PUMC believed that it could provide a great service to the community 
by agreeing to assume the responsibility of overseeing the city’s first psychopathic hospital. 
There, they would not only take on insane patients for treatment purposes, but additionally use 
these patients as examples for instructional training for medical students. By introducing Chinese 
doctors to the current theories and practices of Western psychiatry, the doctors at the PUMC 
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hoped that the Chinese would adopt Western techniques so as to tackle the problem of mental 
illness on their own. 
 
Suspicions Refuted 
It was at the Beijing Municipal Archives that I first learned of the collaborative effort 
between the PUMC and the Beiping authorities (first the Social Affairs Bureau and later the 
Ministry of Hygiene) to fund, manage, and oversee treatment at the Psychopathic Hospital. I 
originally suspected that the PUMC was enthusiastic about the prospect, since it would enable 
them to become more involved in the welfare of the community. However, upon reading a 
number of administrative documents pertaining to the handover, it soon became clear that the 
PUMC had entered into the agreement as a last resort, and was quite relieved to be cleared of its 
responsibility when the hospital was moved outside of the city walls in 1939. 
 Throughout the 1920s, Andrew H. Woods, head of the department of neurology at the 
PUMC, continually strove to expand his division into a department of neurology and psychiatry. 
The plan received a welcome response from Roger Greene, resident director of the CMB and 
later acting director of the PUMC. Throughout the 1920s, Greene and Woods proposed to the 
CMB that the Board grant sufficient funding for a psychiatry ward and neuro-psychiatric 
building. Although the CMB resolved to furnish the recommended funds, numerous unforeseen 
problems caused the CMB to stall on its delivery.  
First, the PUMC had an exceedingly difficult time recruiting competent neurologists and 
psychiatrists to the hospital. Since the field of neurology was relatively new at the time, the best-
trained men were consistently offered better paying and higher-ranking positions at medical 
institutions in the United States, and very few entertained the option to travel to a remote 
location in order to work at a relatively young institution. Second, in order to induce foreigners 
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to join the PUMC, the board of directors opted to give them a much higher pay grade than their 
Chinese counterparts, which prompted certain well-respected Chinese neurologists to seek 
employment elsewhere.
7
 Third, although the department of neurology was already floundering, 
Woods decided to submit his resignation at the end of the decade, which left the nascent 
neurology ward without a director. During the next few years, Ernst de Vries took over the reins 
of the operation, but did not show a proclivity toward psychiatric work.
8
 It was not until 1932, 
when Richard Lyman was installed as chief of the department of neurology, that the option to 
expand outward into psychiatry was again entertained. 
 By this point, however, the CMB was not in a financial position to supply the necessary 
funds. Despite the fact that numerous physicians pointed out the dire need for a psychiatric ward 
at the hospital, financial support was not forthcoming, and the plan was scrapped.
9
 Instead, 
Lyman proposed to cooperate with the municipal authorities to take over the administration of 
the local asylum. The measure, Lyman insisted, was merely a stopgap until the hospital could 
afford to build its own teaching facilities. Although the PUMC saw certain benefits to working 
with the municipality—they could avoid the burden of housing chronic cases, and the 
municipality would fund half of the effort—they were not completely enthusiastic about the joint 
venture. As Greene wrote in a letter to the CMB, the asylum venture was a means of 
“temporarily” providing some “less expensive way for at least practical teaching of mental 
disease to our students.” The PUMC would provide funds “on an extremely modest basis” in 
order to keep the asylum running, and when they received their own psychiatric pavilion, would 
make plans for the “entire support of the municipal asylum” to be assumed by the city.10  
Throughout the 1930s, the PUMC continued to petition the CMB to grant them the 
necessary capital to establish a separate department of neurology and psychiatry within the 
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college, yet the funding never materialized.
11
 Lyman, Greene, and other high-ranking members 
of the College never failed to make it clear, however, that the primary reason they wished to 
establish the new department was not for the purpose better treatment of patients, but for training 
new medical students. In fact, the staff of the PUMC did not ever show a willingness or desire to 
treat the Chinese mentally ill on a large scale, particularly if they showed signs of becoming 
chronic patients. This attitude became even more evident when the Psychopathic Hospital was 
moved outside the northern walls of the city in 1939. 
For reasons unknown—though it most likely had to do with major budget cuts within the 
Ministry of Hygiene
12—the Beiping municipality decided to uproot the Psychopathic Hospital to 
the north of the city at the end of the decade. The new location proved inconvenient for the 
PUMC, and they decided to discontinue their work at the asylum. Nevertheless, the PUMC staff 
was not displeased at the change of events. As H.S. Houghton wrote in a letter to the chairman of 
the CMB, E.C. Lobenstine, the PUMC had decided to pull out of their agreement with the 
municipal government due to the distance and extra costs involved in transport to the asylum. So 
as not to leave the municipality empty-handed, they worked out an agreement in which PUMC 
neurologist Wei Yulin would continue his work as head of the asylum, and in return, the city 
would furnish the PUMC with fifteen specially selected patients to be used for teaching and 
study purposes at the College itself. The nine males and six females would be installed in a small 
ward in Lockhart Hall, and could be transferred back to the asylum at any point. “The College 
will have therefore a stream of carefully selected clinical psychiatric material, and will not be 
faced with an accumulation of hopeless cases which cannot be discharged,” Houghton wrote. 
The set-up, he continued, proved to be “an excellent solution of a difficult and long-standing 
problem.”13 
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Through an unexpected series of events, the PUMC finally solved the problem of how to 
train neurological and psychiatric specialists while avoiding the burden of chronic cases and the 
ever-present problem of insufficient funding. My original assumption—that the PUMC became 
involved with the municipal asylum for purely curative reasons—turned out to be false. Instead, 
the PUMC was more concerned with the question of how to train a future class of Chinese 
practitioners, so that the Chinese themselves could take over the reins of the hospital or establish 
their own clinical practices. In other words, for the PUMC, educating the Chinese to become 
psychiatrists and neurologists was more pressing than treating existing cases of mental illness. 
 
Information Clarified 
The RF and CMB records of the PUMC operations at the Psychopathic Hospital were 
particularly useful in terms of the detail they provided about expenses, salaries, and hiring 
policies. For example, a statement of asylum accounts, copied in a letter from Greene to M.K. 
Eggleston, secretary for the CMB, detailed the income and expenditures that accrued to both the 
PUMC and the municipal government over a four-month period in 1933. The account shows that 
although the costs of the maintenance and upkeep of the asylum were roughly equal for both 
parties during this time, the PUMC ended up assuming a larger proportion of the total cost than 
the municipality (close to $1,000 more out of a grand total of $9,000). Such an imbalance likely 
did not endear the PUMC to its co-managers.  
The records also demonstrate where funds were being spent and in what proportions. The 
largest amount of spending went toward food and fuel; salaries and wages came second, and 
improvements to the facility came third.
14
 Indeed, the amount of money spent on the facility 
itself soon proved to be insufficient. In 1935, the PUMC put a proposal toward the board of the 
CMB to allot $7,000 for the construction of better facilities for the insane; having found that 
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there was no proper way to deal with the violently insane within the existent asylum, the PUMC 
desired to have the present facility expanded (or moved elsewhere) so as to more effectively, and 
more humanely, care for destructive patients.
15
 The funds were never furnished. 
 Records within these files reveal interesting information about the staff of the PUMC. For 
example, Andrew H. Woods, who led the department of neurology for close to a decade, was not 
actually the first choice of the PUMC board of directors; they desired, instead, to hire a Dr. 
Hamilton, who turned down the offer.
16
 Finally, the materials offer a look inside the 
discrepancies in pay between foreign staff and Chinese staff. Dr. Wei Yulin, who was promoted 
to rank of associate professor in 1930, was only paid $3,300 a year; at the height of his career, 
and upon his reappointment in 1933, he still only earned $4,000 annually. On the other hand, Dr. 
Woods was given an entry salary in 1919 starting at $4,700 (including an annual housing 
allowance); upon his reappointment four years later, his salary was increased to $11,500.
17
 It was 
no wonder, then, that the College often had trouble retaining its Chinese staff—in spite of the 
fact that the ultimate goal of the PUMC was to eventually turn over the institution to the Chinese. 
The Rockefeller Archive Center was an invaluable source of information. Files on the 
PUMC, Psychopathic Hospital, and CMB provided critical information about the history and 
institutional evolution of the College, as well as its role in the greater Beijing community and its 
goals for continued expansion. By discovering that the PUMC only involved itself in the routine 
operation of the municipal Psychopathic Hospital as a last resort—and freed itself from its 
obligations in the endeavor as soon as it was given the chance—I will be better able to position 
the asylum in its correct historical context. 
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